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SCALING THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: 
CONFRONTING ISSUES OF EQUALITY STEMMING FROM 
FINANCING RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES UNDER 
DUAL FEDERALISM 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion. . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
School children all across the country learn this provision of the First 
Amendment as the “separation of church and state.”  But this provision, 
commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause, was not part of the original 
drafting of the Constitution, which instead stood silent on the issue of religion.2  
This was not an oversight by the framers; rather, the majority believed they 
had addressed the concern of religious freedom by expressly excluding it from 
the enumerated powers of the new government.3  But not all were convinced 
that this exclusion provided an adequate restraint on power.4  The Anti-
Federalists felt the Constitution gave too much power to the new federal 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. For an idea of the powers and limits originally placed upon the branches of government, 
see the following provisions of the United States Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing 
a list of enumerated powers for the legislative branch); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing several 
limits on the powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (explaining that the President’s 
executive power includes the role of Commander in Chief over the Army, Navy, and Militia, and 
that with the approval of Congress, he has the power to make treaties and judicial appointments); 
U.S. CONST. art. III (describing the powers of jurisdiction over certain types of cases of vested in 
the Supreme Court). 
 3. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 
UTAH L. REV. 895, 895–96 (1987).   James Madison originally opposed the addition of a Bill of 
Rights.  RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
159–60 (2006).  He believed that rights not expressly given to the new government were 
automatically reserved to the people.  Id.  Furthermore, Madison believed that adding an 
amendment regarding religious freedom or any other civil liberty ran the risk of being either too 
broad or too narrow.  Id. 
 4. Not all delegates present at the Constitutional Convention and the signing of the original 
Constitution were convinced this was adequate.  See LABUNSKI, supra note 3, at 10.  Even before 
the document was sent to the states for their review, and ultimately their ratification, there was 
talk of holding a second convention to address shortcomings of the first document.  Id. 
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government and did not adequately protect the individual rights of the people.5  
This group refused to support the Constitution unless it contained a separate 
Bill of Rights, expressly setting out individual rights to “serve as a barrier 
between the central government, the respective states, and their citizens.”6  The 
Anti-Federalists ultimately won the debate, and ten amendments survived 
congressional debate and state ratification to become the Bill of Rights.7 
But, those Amendments are still subject to judicial review and 
interpretation, and over the years, the Court has carved out various exceptions.  
To see this effect, one need only look at the long history of mixed results from 
the Court’s application of the Establishment Clause.8  The variety of issues 
considered by the Court over the years includes prayer in school, posting 
religious symbols and displays on public property, and school voucher 
programs that indirectly fund parochial schools.9  Perhaps one of the hottest 
issues in today’s recession-weary society is the constitutionality of granting 
public funds to religiously affiliated colleges and universities (RACs).  This is 
an issue for courts and lawmakers at both the state and federal level. 
 
 5. Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federal and State Bills of Rights: A Historical Look at 
the Relationship Between America’s Documents of Individual Freedom, 36 HOW. L.J. 43, 57 
(1993). 
 6. Id. (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787, at 536 (1969)).  Three key states, the most populous states of the fledgling union, 
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, initially refused to ratify the new Constitution without 
the inclusion of a Bill of Rights.  Id.  Virginia’s state constitution already included a Declaration 
of Rights, which included religious freedom.  See id. at 51.  This document was a major influence 
on the eventual federal Bill of Rights.  See discussion infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 7. Twelve Amendments were actually submitted to the states for ratification.  LABUNSKI, 
supra note 3, at 240.  For a discussion of the congressional debate of the proposed amendments, 
see generally id. at 213–40.  While most accept that the first ten Amendments comprise the Bill 
of Rights, others consider it to be only the first eight.  Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, The New Constitution, Address at Princeton University (Jan. 
15, 1985), in 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 890 (1997). 
 8. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 
(1984). 
 9. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (concluding that 
displays of the Ten Commandments in several county courthouses in Kentucky was a violation of 
the First Amendment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (companion case to 
McCreary County, ruling that a Ten Commandments display at a courthouse in Texas was not 
unconstitutional); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–46 (2002) (holding that an Ohio 
voucher program which allowed parents to receive government funds to pay any private school 
tuition, even parochial school tuition, did not violate the Establishment Clause); Lee, 505 U.S. at 
599 (finding that clergy-led prayer at an official school graduation ceremony was 
unconstitutional); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that the erection of the annual Christmas 
nativity display in a public park did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
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At the state level, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently held in University 
of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker10 that the Baptist university’s receipt of 
state funds for construction of a new pharmacy school violated the Kentucky 
Constitution.11  On the national stage, all eyes have been on the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), better known as the 
“Stimulus Package” or “Bailout Bill,” which was passed in February 2009.12  
Among a laundry list of new spending, ARRA allows use of federal funds for 
certain projects at RACs.13  Though it defers to state law in the use of these 
funds, states can vary widely in their mandate of separation of church and 
state, creating additional concern that these universities and their students are 
not receiving equal treatment across the country.14 
Part I of this note discusses Supreme Court opinions that have shaped 
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence—from the Court’s attempt to 
recapture the framer’s intent, to the troubled state of the current test.  This 
section also discusses how the Supreme Court has applied Establishment 
Clause principles to federal funding of RACs and some of the issues 
surrounding ARRA.  Part II then discusses differences between federal and 
state constitutional provisions, and how states have adjudicated RAC funding 
challenges arising under state law.  Part III provides an in-depth case study of 
two recent state constitutional cases involving the funding of RACs.  The two 
cases featured in this section arose under similar state constitutional provisions, 
but resulted in dramatically different results by the respective state supreme 
courts.  Finally, Part IV discusses ongoing federal constitutional issues arising 
out of such unpredictable state adjudication, including failed attempts to strike 
down these provisions.  Part IV also proposes how to better equalize the 
outcomes of adjudication among the states. 
 
 10. Univ. of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Ky. 2010), aff’g 
Pennybacker v. Beshear, No. 06-CI-00554, 2008 WL 644848, at *1 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 
2008).  The original case was named for Rev. Albert M. Pennybacker and the current governor of 
Kentucky.  Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *1.  The University of the Cumberlands was an 
intervening defendant in the original action but was the one to appeal the adverse summary 
judgment ruling of the district court.  Univ. of Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 672. 
 11. Univ. of Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 679. 
 12. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 13. See, e.g., id. § 14001, 123 Stat. at 279 (instructing governors to refrain from considering 
the type or mission of an institution of higher education). 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
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I.  THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Attempting to Capture the Founder’s Intent 
Though one would hardly dispute that Supreme Court decisions regarding 
separation of church and state have been anything but consistent, the Court has 
tried to act with an eye toward history, attempting to channel the intentions of 
our founding fathers.15  In Everson v. Board of Education,16 the Court 
reiterated the meaning of the Establishment Clause: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.  Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion.  No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to 
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups and vice versa.17 
In addition, the Court quoted Thomas Jefferson’s statement that the 
Establishment Clause was meant to create “a wall of separation between 
church and State.”18 
This 1947 Everson opinion reestablished a clear picture of the goal of the 
Establishment Clause, but provided no uniform, coherent way to test whether a 
particular government action violated the First Amendment.19  Finally, in 1971, 
the Court put forth a test of constitutionality in Lemon v. Kurtzman.20  The 
Lemon test states: 1) A statute must have a secular purpose; 2) The primary 
effect of the statute can neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) A statute 
cannot support “excessive government entanglement with religion.”21  The test 
 
 15. Cord & Ball, supra note 3, at 896. 
 16. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 17. Id. at 15–16. 
 18. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).  It is from this 
phrase that we get the common reference to “separation of church and state.” Id.  The quoted 
phrase has been traced back to an 1802 reply letter from Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist 
Association commenting on the First Amendment.  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.  See also Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/ 
loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. 
 19. Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2006). 
 20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); Alembik, supra note 19, at 1177–78. 
 21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasis added). 
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may seem simple enough, but in the forty years since the Lemon test was 
announced, it has been criticized, modified, and sometimes even ignored by 
the Court.22 
One notable attempt to modify the Lemon test was Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, which proposed a clarification of the 
purpose prong to make the test more applicable.23  Justice O’Connor believed 
the proper question was whether the intent of the questioned government 
action was to “convey a message of endorsement or disapproval” of any 
particular religion.24  The following year, in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice 
O’Connor again expressed concerns over the applicability of the Lemon test.25  
Offering a further refinement of Lemon, Justice O’Connor suggested the 
analysis should focus on “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the 
text, legislative history, and implementation” of the state action, would 
consider it an endorsement of religion.26  Despite these repeated attempts to 
clarify and refine the Lemon test, it continues to have a shaky reputation with 
the Court.27 
But not all believed modification was the answer; some felt that Lemon 
simply did not work in certain circumstances.28 In a mark of departure, the 
Court in Marsh v. Chambers avoided applying Lemon to the Nebraska state 
legislature’s practice of opening sessions with a prayer by introducing the 
alternative historical analysis/practice test.29  In finding that the tradition did 
not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court stated historical patterns alone 
could not justify constitutional violations, but found the contested practice had 
“become part of the fabric of our society,” thus making it a “tolerable 
acknowledgement” of widely held beliefs.30  This was not the only alternative 
test developed by the Court.  In Lee v. Weisman, the Court applied the coercion 
test to invalidate the giving of a prayer at a public school graduation.31  The 
 
 22. Alembik, supra note 19, at 1173–74. 
 23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 691 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 691.  This clarification by Justice O’Connor came to be known as the 
“endorsement test” and was widely adopted by the courts.  Alembik, supra note 19, at 1181–82.  
Courts continue to apply the endorsement test when analyzing the validity of government action 
under Lemon.  Id. 
 25. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68–69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 76.  Ten years later, Justice O’Connor further elaborated on the “objective 
observer” principle stating that it was like the “reasonable person” from tort law in that it was not 
an actual individual but a “personification of a community ideal.”  Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 27. See Alembik, supra note 19, at 1184–85. 
 28. See id. at 1189 (noting Justice Rehnquist found the Lemon test was “not useful” in 
dealing with the constitutionality of a religious monument erected in Texas). 
 29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–88 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 790, 792. 
 31. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
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Court held that the peer pressure to stand or remain silent during the prayer had 
the effect of coercing students to participate in religion, thus violating the 
Establishment Clause.32 
Despite the mixed reviews and departures, the Court has never officially 
overruled Lemon.  Perhaps Justice Scalia said it best: “The secret of the Lemon 
test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill.  It is there to scare us (and our 
audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the 
tomb at will.”33  Some scholars suggest that the use of alternative tests and the 
general acceptance of Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test” indicate that the 
Court is becoming more tolerant of overlap between government and 
religion.34  One place this increasing tolerance appears is in the funding of 
RACs. 
B. Funding of RACs Under the Establishment Clause and Lemon 
Despite the seemingly strict construction of the language of the 1947 
Everson opinion,35 some believe Justice Black actually laid the groundwork for 
a “neutrality” principle which could allow such government funding if done on 
an equal basis.36  In the years since Everson, this neutrality principle has taken 
one of three forms: 1) the ability to separate secular and sectarian functions of 
the RAC; 2) individual free choice of which school to attend where the funds 
pass to an RAC by way of individual tuition dollars; or 3) diversity of those 
benefitting from the aid.37  The method that comes under the heaviest criticism, 
of course, is the first, where funds can pass directly to a RAC in what would 
seem to be an apparent violation of the Establishment Clause. 
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court approved certain direct government 
funding for RACs, opening a door in the wall of separation between church 
 
 32. Id. at 598. 
 33. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  This statement by Justice Scalia could not have been truer than in June 
2005, when the Court handed down two seemingly conflicting opinions on the constitutionality of 
Ten Commandments monuments on public property on the same day.  Compare Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 682, 692 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding that a display of the Ten 
Commandments which stood on the capitol grounds unopposed for nearly forty years did not 
violate the Establishment Clause), with McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 855–56, 
881 (2005) (concluding that a planned Ten Commandments monument on the courthouse grounds 
as part of a larger “Foundations of American Law and Government Display” did violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
 34. Alembik, supra note 19, at 1184. 
 35. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 36.  D. Michael Murray, Note, Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the University 
of Virginia: A Battle Between Establishment Clause Principles and First Amendment Clauses 
Further Weakens the Wall of Separation, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 571–72 (1997). 
 37. Id. at 577. 
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and state.38  In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court considered government funding 
of a RAC under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.39  Interestingly, 
this case was decided the same day as Lemon and applied the same principles, 
but unlike Lemon, the Court concluded that such funding was constitutional.40  
Lemon and Tilton were similar in issue: Lemon concerned government funding 
of a parochial secondary school, and Tilton involved funding for construction 
at a RAC.41  The Tilton Court felt that funding a college or university posed a 
much smaller danger because children at that age are far less impressionable.42  
The Court also based its decision on the fact that the proposed facilities 
themselves were religiously neutral and that the university was committed to 
academic freedom.43  Furthermore, the funding would be a one-time 
government grant rather than recurring financing, thus eliminating the need for 
continued government intervention or entanglement to ensure compliance.44  
This is in stark contrast to the major concern over the proposed funding in 
Lemon—funding of teachers’ salaries at parochial primary and secondary 
schools—which the Court believed would require unfeasible government 
 
 38. See Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment, Having One’s Cake and Eating it Too: 
Government Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and 
Universities, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1989); see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 
U.S. 736, 744, 766–67 (1976) (finding that annual funding to four Catholic colleges was not 
unconstitutional because the colleges were largely committed to academic freedom like public 
universities); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 738, 749 (1973) (concluding that issuing revenue 
bonds to a religious university under South Carolina statute for purposes of construction and 
repair of certain campus facilities was constitutional); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 674–
77, 689 (1971) (holding that religiously affiliated universities were eligible for federal funding 
like other institutions of higher learning and that such funding did not violate the Establishment 
Clause).  Having opened this door, in 1975, government funding of RACs reached a half billion 
dollars.  Maguire, supra, at 1066 n.21 (citing PAUL J. WEBER & DENNIS A. GILBERT, PRIVATE 
CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS 101 (1981)). 
 39. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674–75. 
 40. Maguire, supra note 38, at 1069; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678, 689. 
 41. Maguire, supra note 38, at 1068–69. 
 42. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687–88.  In addition to the higher level of maturity of college 
students, college attendance is also voluntary, which some also consider a basis for the dual 
constitutional treatment of funding primary and secondary schools versus colleges and 
universities.  F. King Alexander, The Decline and Fall of the Wall of Separation Between Church 
and State and Its Consequences for the Funding of Public and Private Institutions of Higher 
Education, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114 (1998). 
 43. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681 (finding that the facilities funded at the four institutions in 
question included two libraries, a language laboratory, a science building, and an arts and theater 
building and that there was no evidence that any religious indoctrination had “seep[ed]” into these 
facilities). 
 44. Id. at 687–88. 
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monitoring to ensure public money was not used to teach non-secular 
subjects.45 
Within five years, the Supreme Court upheld state funding of RACs in two 
additional cases, Hunt v. McNair46 and Roemer v. Board of Public Works.47  
The issue in Hunt was very similar to that in Tilton, and the Court essentially 
affirmed its previous ruling, upholding a state grant of revenue bonds to fund 
construction of secular facilities at a Baptist university.48  By contrast, the issue 
in Roemer involved a general (rather than “for construction”), annual (rather 
than one-time) grant of state funds.49  Under the challenged state statute, funds 
could not “be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes.”50  To help 
ensure compliance with the statute, all institutions receiving public money 
were required to submit an annual report identifying the subsidized 
expenditures.51  In holding the funding constitutional, the Court determined the 
universities were not “pervasively sectarian,” meaning a secular purpose was 
distinguishable from their religious affiliation.52  This determination was based 
largely upon evidence of academic freedom and a high degree of autonomy 
from the Catholic Church, despite the university holding religious exercises on 
campus and mandating theology courses.53  Addressing the seemingly 
troublesome reporting requirement, the Court held it was not “excessive 
entanglement” because audits would be “quick and nonjudgmental,” due to the 
ease of separation between secular and sectarian activities.54 
In short, the Court seems permissive of neutral government funding of 
RACs.  So long as funding is designated for a secular facility or project and the 
 
 45. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1971).  Thus, the stumbling block for 
the proposed funding in Lemon was the entanglement prong of the three prong test articulated by 
the Court.  Maguire, supra note 38, at 1069. 
 46. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
 47. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
 48. Compare Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743–46, with Tilton, 403 U.S. 672. 
 49. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 755, 758. 
 53. Id. at 755–56.  The Court found that the religious exercises were an optional spiritual 
development opportunity for students and were viewed as a secondary objective of the 
institution—secondary to academic achievement.  Id.  At the same time, while theology courses 
were a required part of the students’ academic curriculum, the Court regarded them as part of a 
well rounded liberal arts education.  Id. 
 54. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763–64.  At first glance, the decision in Roemer seems to conflict 
with Lemon, where the Court struck down the reimbursement of parochial school teachers’ 
salaries for fear that the ongoing monitoring would constitute excessive entanglement.  The real 
reason for the different outcomes likely stems from the fact that the Court did not believe that a 
religious elementary or secondary school could have a dominant purpose that was secular, 
whereas the idea of academic freedom tends to dominate at an institution of higher learning.  See 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685–86 (1971). 
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institution has a separate and distinct purpose apart from its religious 
affiliation, the Court will likely uphold the funding.  Congress also seems to 
embrace some degree of neutral funding of RACs, as evidenced most recently 
by ARRA—the 2009 stimulus package.  The issues and debate surrounding 
this new legislation are discussed in the next section. 
C. Current Issues Surrounding Government Funding of RACs 
When ARRA was signed into law in February 2009, there was already 
much controversy over spending tax dollars to try to stimulate the national 
economy.  But adding to that controversy was a new spending provision for 
“modernization, renovation, or repair” of public schools and institutions of 
higher learning.55  The Act states “A Governor shall not consider the type or 
mission of an institution of higher education, and shall consider any institution 
for funding . . . .”56  While the state must consider “religious” and public 
universities equally, the law makes it clear that funds may not be used to 
renovate or repair facilities “used for sectarian instruction or religious 
worship” or where “a substantial portion of the functions . . . are subsumed in a 
religious mission.”57  Neither may funds be used for improvements to athletic 
or administrative facilities, general maintenance costs, or the purchase of 
vehicles.58  Thus, ARRA once again opens the door for federal funding of 
RACs, so long as the money goes to secular educational instruction. 
Despite the apparent contradiction of separation of church and state, the 
Act has sparked debates of being too restrictive.  Former Arkansas governor 
Mike Huckabee and Senator Jim DeMint have called the stimulus package 
“anti-religious.”59  Their concern was that the restrictions would prohibit all 
religious activity in a federally-funded building, which could affect student 
groups’ ability to hold meetings in those facilities.60  DeMint proposed an 
amendment to the stimulus bill that would have removed the limitations on 
how RACs could utilize the federal funds.61  Ironically, if DeMint’s 
amendment had passed, eliminating the covenants restricting the use of the 
funds, the Act would most certainly have been unconstitutional—amounting to 
an unequivocal endorsement of religion in violation of the First Amendment.62  
Rather, as the language of the Act stands, intermittent religious student activity 
 
 55. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14002(b)(1), 
123 Stat. 115, 280 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 56. Id. § 14002(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 281 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. § 14004(c)(3), 123 Stat. at 281–82. 
 58. Id. § 14003(b), 123 Stat. at 281. 
 59. Tobin Grant, Is the Stimulus Act Anti-Religious?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Feb. 18, 2009, 
1:23 PM), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/februaryweb-only/107-31.0.html. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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at institutions that receive the funding will not be affected so long as the main 
purpose of the building or facility is secular in nature.63 
On the flipside, others believe that the spending provision is too 
permissive.  To quell those fears, the Act provides one final caveat: “Nothing 
in this section shall allow a local educational agency to engage in school 
modernization, renovation, or repair that is inconsistent with State law.”64  This 
deference to state law can have a huge impact on the ability of a RAC to 
receive funding, because state constitutions and statutes can be far more 
restrictive than their federal counterparts.  One example of such heightened 
restrictions is Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution, the provision under 
which University of the Cumberlands was decided,65 which states, “[n]o 
portion of any fund or tax . . . levied for educational purposes, shall be 
apportioned to, or used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or 
denominational school.”66  The following section further explores these 
differences between federal and state guarantees of religious freedom. 
II.  A SURGE IN STATE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Origin and Amendment of State Constitutional Guarantees of Religious 
Freedom 
Some of the guaranteed personal freedoms that Americans know and enjoy 
today actually predate the federal Bill of Rights, as several colonies drafted 
similar individual protections into their original charters.67  These protections 
began to take the shape of a more formal “Bill of Rights” around the start of 
the American Revolution when the colonial governments were strongly 
encouraged to begin drafting their own “state” constitutions.68  The Virginia 
 
 63. For a discussion of the circumstances under which federal courts will generally uphold 
government funding for constructing facilities at RACs, see supra Part I.B.  Occasional use by 
student organizations wishing to conduct religious services and other religious activities does not 
make the primary function of the facility religious.  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273–75 
(1981).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that once a building is constructed and made 
generally available for use by the public and student groups, it is unconstitutional for the 
university to deny access to religious student organizations.  Id. at 277.  Thus, concerns about 
student groups being turned away from such federally-funded buildings are without merit. 
 64. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14002(c), 123 
Stat. 115, 281 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (emphasis added). 
 65. For a full discussion of this provision and the Kentucky courts’ interpretation of it, see 
infra Part III.B. 
 66. KY. CONST. § 189. 
 67. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 48–49.  Several colonial charters included guarantees of 
religious freedom as early as the late-1600s.  Id. at 48. 
 68. Id. at 49.  Some states chose to enumerate individual rights in a separate document, 
similar to the subsequent federal Bill of Rights, while other states incorporated them directly into 
the text of the constitution.  Id.  However, not all of the original thirteen states had formally 
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Declaration of Rights was the first to be drafted and was one of the most 
instrumental, heavily influencing several sister states as well as the federal Bill 
of Rights.69 
Even from the start, however, each state’s bill of rights varied in 
specificity.70  For example, the first Virginia Declaration of Rights, speaking 
on the right of religious freedom, simply stated “all men are equally entitled to 
the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .”71  
The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was modeled after Virginia’s, but 
included more detail,72 declaring “no man ought, or of right can be compelled 
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or 
maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against his own free will and 
consent . . . .”73  Many state constitutions have been amended multiple times 
since their enactment, and several now include significant detail concerning 
government entanglement with religion.74 
An important round of amendments came in the mid-1800s amid debate 
over taxation of private colleges and universities.75  This, coupled with strong 
anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment, prompted states to add more 
restrictive provisions to their constitutions.76  These amendments, generally 
called the Blaine Amendments, prohibit state legislatures from giving any 
financial aid or support to “sectarian” schools.77  Immediately following the 
adoption of these provisions it was much more difficult for RACs to obtain 
public funding.78  For nearly a century, state courts sent an unwavering 
message—all funding of RACs was prohibited, whether in the form of direct 
 
adopted a Bill of Rights by the time of the American Revolution, or even by the adoption of the 
Constitution.  See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 890. 
 69. Pearson, supra note 5, at 49–50. 
 70. See id. at 50–53. 
 71. VA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I, § 16 (1776). 
 72. Pearson, supra note 5, at 51–52. 
 73. PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I , § 2 (1776). 
 74. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 62. 
 75. Alexander, supra note 42, at 111. 
 76. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT 
L. REV. 85, 86 (2003). 
 77. Id. at 85.  See also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine 
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 
554–55 (2003).  The Amendments are named for Representative James Blaine who proposed a 
similar amendment for the federal constitution but was unable to secure enough votes in Congress 
for its adoption.  Id. at 556, 573.  Today thirty-seven states still have such amendments in place.  
Gedicks, supra note 76, at 85.  However, many have questioned the discriminatory nature of 
these amendments, and in recent years, courts have increasingly questioned their constitutionality.  
DeForrest, supra, at 606–07. 
 78. Alexander, supra note 42, at 111–12. 
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funding or indirect assistance through scholarships, grants, and vouchers.79  
When Congress and the Supreme Court began to take a more liberal view of 
funding RACs in the mid-twentieth century, state courts saw a change as 
well.80 
A. State Adjudication of Challenges to Funding RACs 
In 1963, Congress passed the Higher Education Facilities Act,81 followed 
by the Higher Education Act of 196582 which, like ARRA, provided funding 
for construction of “academic facilities” at institutions of higher education 
without distinguishing between public, private, and religious universities.83  
This led to several federal cases challenging such government funding, 
followed by the controversial Supreme Court decisions finding the practice 
constitutional.84  The federal courts, however, were not the only ones 
adjudicating challenges of constitutionality.  State courts also saw an increase 
in the number of cases challenging funding of RACs with litigants asserting a 
violation of state constitutional rights.85 
Some attribute this rise to the fact people were unhappy with the liberal 
decisions coming from the federal courts on the granting of government money 
to RACs.86  It was becoming increasingly harder to overcome the mounting 
federal precedent tending to allow funding when it was allocated to academic 
facilities with little or no religious intertwining.87  But when a state provision 
was also implicated, the state court could strike down the disfavored spending 
by finding that it did not violate the federal Establishment Clause, but that it 
did violate the more prohibitive state constitutional provision.88  Furthermore, 
under Michigan v. Long, by adjudicating the issue on “adequate and 
 
 79. Id. at 112–13. 
 80. Id. at 113–14. 
 81. Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 106, 77 Stat. 363, 368 
(1963) (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970)). 
 82. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 111, 79 Stat. 1219, 1224 (1965) 
(codified in 20 U.S.C. § 716 (1964)). 
 83. Alexander, supra note 42, at 115. 
 84. See supra Part I.B. 
 85. This was part of the New Judicial Federalism movement.  Jennifer DiGiovanni, Justice 
Charles M. Leibson and the Revival of State Constitutional Law: A Microcosm of a Movement, 86 
KY. L.J. 1009, 1014 (1998). 
 86. See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 893. 
 87. See supra Part I.B. 
 88. See Wilentz, supra note 7, at 892.  Under such a practice the state court would adjudicate 
the issue on an “adequate and independent state ground.”  DiGiovanni, supra note 85, at 1016.  
This practice was heavily criticized, however, due to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional inability 
to review a state supreme court decision decided on independent grounds.  Id.  Some believe that 
this practice allowed what was truly a federal question to be wrongly decided.  Id. 
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independent state grounds,” the ruling was not subject to review by the 
Supreme Court.89 
But bringing the action before a state court also provided an opportunity 
for a new viewpoint into whether an institution was wholly “religious” in 
nature.  One of the leading cases of the time, Horace Mann League v. Board of 
Public Works,90 was influential more for the way the decision was reached 
rather than for the decision itself.  In Horace Mann League, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a matching grant—a type 
of direct funding—to four religious colleges under both federal and state law.91  
The court ultimately concluded that funding to three of the schools violated the 
First Amendment due to the sectarian nature of the institutions.92  But in 
reaching this decision, the court looked at six different criteria: 1) the stated 
purpose of the college; 2) the religious control of the governing board; 3) the 
extent of financial assistance from and, affiliation with, religious organizations; 
4) the prominence of religion at the school—including in the curriculum, the 
architecture, and sponsorship of religious activities; 5) the accreditation of the 
program and activities of alumni; and 6) the work and image of the college 
within the community.93 
The criteria used in Horace Mann League continue to play a role in 
challenges to RAC funding even today.  Several states with more restrictive 
constitutional provisions must determine whether the institution receiving the 
challenged funding is indeed “religious.”94  As seen in the case studies below, 
some of these state courts look to similar criteria as those used by the 
Maryland Court to determine the true nature of these schools.95  But, as is also 
evident from the case studies, not every state approaches challenges to RAC 
funding in the same way, thus raising concerns of Equal Protection.96 
 
 89. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).  Where the state issues were interwoven 
with federal law, a state had to make it clear that any federal precedent used in the course of the 
decision was merely for guidance and did not compel the court to reach the conclusion that it did.  
Only then would the Supreme Court find the state grounds to be “adequate and independent,” and 
thus not subject to its appellate review.  Id. at 1040–41. 
 90. Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51 (Md. 1966). 
 91. Id. at 53. 
 92. Id. at 67–69, 73. 
 93. Id. at 65–66. 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
 95. See infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text. 
 96. Equal Protection, of course, refers to the provision “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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III.  CASE STUDIES: RECENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ON FUNDING 
RACS 
A. Case Study: Saint Louis University v. Masonic Temple Association of St. 
Louis 
1. Facts, Arguments, and Court Findings 
In 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
using public funding for construction of a new arena at Saint Louis University, 
a Jesuit Catholic university.97  The university was granted $8 million dollars in 
tax increment financing (TIF)98 by the City of St. Louis toward construction of 
a 13,000-seat arena for sporting events, graduations, and various other secular 
purposes.99  The arena was also part of a larger city-wide redevelopment 
project for blighted areas.100  The city had passed an ordinance to establish the 
necessary TIF assistance for the arena and other redevelopment projects that 
were secular in nature, including theaters, parking areas, housing, and 
educational facilities.101 
The Masonic Temple Association of St. Louis (Masons) objected to the 
funding, arguing that it violated the Missouri Establishment Clause because the 
university was controlled by a religious creed.102  The Missouri Constitution is 
more restrictive than others on the guarantee of religious freedom, stating “no 
preference shall be given to . . . any church, sect or creed of religion, or any 
form of religious faith or worship,” with “preference” stated to include public 
funding.103  More specifically, with respect to education, the Missouri 
Constitution mandates that no government municipality “shall ever make an 
appropriation . . . to help to support or sustain any private or public school, 
academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning 
 
 97. Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Mo. 
2007). 
 98. The way such tax increment financing works is that for each year following the planned 
project, the taxpayer will make payments instead of paying taxes on the increased valuation of the 
property.  See Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. 
1989).  The amount of the payment is equal to what would have been collected in tax revenue on 
the increase in assessed value due to the redevelopment project.  Id.  Payments are then placed in 
a special fund and used as security for the bonds that were issued by the city to fund the project.  
Id. 
 99. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724. 
 100. Id. at 724–25.  The city’s redevelopment plan stated that the redevelopment area was the 
cultural theater and artistic center for the city, an area which also included SLU.  SAINT LOUIS, 
MO., CITY ORDINANCES, Introduction to ORDINANCE 65703 (2002–2003).   The plan also stated 
that SLU continued to “serve as an invaluable educational and cultural entities [sic].”  Id. 
 101. SAINT LOUIS, MO., CITY ORDINANCES, at Exhibit IV. 
 102. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726. 
 103. MO. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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controlled by any religious creed.”104  Therefore, to determine whether there 
was a constitutional violation, the court needed to look at the history and 
mission of the university. 
Saint Louis University (SLU) evolved from the St. Louis Academy, 
founded by the Jesuits in 1818.105  Today, the university is run by a president 
who has general control over the management and direction of the business 
and educational affairs of the university.106  Per the university bylaws, the 
president serves as a single member of the Board of Trustees, which controls 
operations of the university by majority vote.107  The bylaws also require that 
the Board be composed of 25 to 55 members, where not less than 6 but not 
more than 12 must be Jesuits.108  The remaining trustees, SLU faculty, and 
student body include non-Catholics and persons with no religious affiliation at 
all.109  The university tradition, however, admittedly tends to follow Jesuit 
philosophies and ideals.110 
It is this Jesuit tradition which formed the heart of the dispute.111  The 
Masons argued that a governing board could be independent and still be 
controlled by a religious creed, if required to operate under a set of laws 
founded on religion, which the Masons believed was the case with SLU.112  
According to the Masons, the school’s own mission statement promoted “the 
pursuit of truth for the greater glory of God” and dedication to a “continuing 
quest for understanding of God’s creation . . . and integration of the values, 
knowledge and skills required to transform Society in the spirit of the 
Gospels.”113 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri (ACLU) filed an 
amicus brief which further bolstered the Mason’s argument that SLU was 
governed by a religious creed, drawing attention to the university’s official 
website.114  The ACLU noted that the website advertised a “Jesuit Education 
Since 1818” on each page and, at the time, featured a picture of the current 
 
 104. Id. § 8. 
 105. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724. 
 106. Id.  At the time the case was being decided, the current president of the university was in 
fact a Jesuit priest, but following recent amendments to the university bylaws, it is no longer 
required that the president be a member of the Jesuit order.  Id. at 724 n.3. 
 107. Id. at 724. 
 108. Id.  At the time of this suit, 9 out of a total of 42 trustees were Jesuits.  Id. 
 109. Id.  At the time of this suit, fewer than one-half of the student body considered 
themselves Catholics.  Id. 
 110. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 724. 
 111. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 24–25, Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d 721 (No. 
SC88075). 
 112. Id. at 29. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Brief for ACLU of E. Mo. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14, Saint Louis 
Univ., 220 S.W.3d 721 (No. SC88075). 
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Jesuit president dressed in clerical clothing.115  It also highlighted a quote from 
a SLU professor that said, “SLU is a great place to grow personally as well as 
spiritually . . . .”116  In addition, the ACLU argued that the Student Life section 
listed Sunday mass as the Catholic students’ “primary celebration of our 
eucharistic community” and also named multiple other programs where 
students and faculty could further their faith and spirituality.117  The ACLU 
also argued that students themselves were under the impression that they were 
attending a Catholic university.118 
Responding to the attack on its mission, SLU acknowledged that in honor 
of tradition it intended to be “identified,” “motivated,” and “guided” by 
Catholic and spiritual ideals, but that it was not “controlled by” these 
purposes.119  Rather, SLU argued that the purposes of the university, as set 
forth in the charter, were “the encouragement of learning and the extension of 
the means of education.”120  Furthermore, SLU declared it was committed to 
serving the community, the nation, and the world through teaching, research, 
and communication of knowledge, much like many other American 
universities.121  This commitment to service and academics, SLU argued, was a 
clear indicator that the university was not controlled by a religious creed.122  
SLU further argued that these values were a “philosophy of education and a 
system of character formation” designed to teach students to take lessons from 
the classroom and reach out to the community, thus helping students to become 
responsible, contributing members of society.123 
The district court agreed with SLU and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the university.124  The Masons appealed to the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, but due to the important nature and general public interest of the 
issue, it was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court before a ruling was 
issued.125  Following the transfer, the Missouri Supreme Court determined the 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 15. 
 117. Id. at 15, 16. 
 118. Id. at 16.  To support this argument, the ACLU cited student debate and opposition over 
adding a socialist-leaning student organization on the ground that the views and principles of 
socialism went against the Catholic Church.  Id. at 16–17. 
 119. Substitute Brief of Respondent Saint Louis Univ. at 50, Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d 
721 (No. SC88075) (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 48. 
 121. Id. at 48–49. 
 122. Id. at 49. 
 123. Id. at 51. 
 124. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 725. 
 125. Id.  The Missouri Constitution grants jurisdiction for order of transfer to the Supreme 
Court when a majority of the court of appeals justices believe the question is of general interest or 
importance.  MO. CONST. art. V, § 10.  Such order for transfer may be made either before or after 
the appellate court has issued an opinion in the case.  Id. 
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key question was not whether the university has any affiliation with religion, 
but whether that religious component “pervades the atmosphere” to give the 
effect of religious control.126  While operation under a religious creed tends to 
indicate the religious affiliation is controlling, mere tradition and aspiration to 
follow the ideals of a given religion or sect are not proof of control by a 
religious creed—“appreciation for” and “control by” are two different 
things.127 
Speaking more specifically on the issue of control, the court found it of 
great importance that the university operated under an independent and 
religiously diverse Board of Trustees.128  Although the university bylaws stated 
SLU will be publicly identified as a Catholic and Jesuit university and will be 
motivated by the moral values of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the court held 
this was insufficient to show control by a religious creed.129  Similarly, there 
was no indication that these aspirations dominated campus life or restricted 
academic freedom, including research and inquiry into matters contrary to 
traditional Catholic teachings.130  The court further noted that the purpose of 
the proposed arena was to provide a venue for secular student and community 
events while improving a deteriorated and blighted area of the city.131  Thus, 
the court held the ordinance allocating TIF funding for construction of the 
arena was constitutional.132 
 
 126. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726. 
 127. Id. at 727. 
 128. Id.  The Missouri Supreme Court had previously held that the existence of an 
independent board of directors is a strong indicator that a university is not “controlled” by 
religion.  See Ams. United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 721 (Mo. 1976). 
 129. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 727–28. 
 130. Id. at 728. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  Interestingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals reached largely the same conclusion 
based on the arguments presented to it prior to the transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court.  In the 
opinion, the court stated that to interpret “control” to mean any kind of religious affiliation would 
unduly expand the reach of the prohibition in Article IX, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution.  
Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, No. ED 86804, 2006 WL 2805606, at 
*4 (Mo. Ct. App., Oct. 3, 2006).  Instead, the court said the provision must be read to exclude 
government aid only when the affiliated religion is advanced though operation of the school.  Id.  
The court of appeals also looked at the purpose of the proposed building—a sports arena—and 
noted that such a building was for a secular rather than religious purpose.  Id.  Following the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, SLU’s Chaifetz Arena was completed in April 2008, 
providing a midsize multipurpose venue within St. Louis City limits, a venue size previously 
unavailable in the downtown area.  Kevin C. Johnson, On the Scene, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
(GET OUT), Jan. 31, 2008, at 15. 
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2. Analysis of the Court’s Decision 
The fact the arena was intended to benefit the community as a whole was 
perhaps underemphasized by the court.  Indeed, only about half of the 
bookings at the arena are directly linked to SLU, with many of these events 
being men’s and women’s basketball games.133  Arguably it would have been 
easy to adjudicate this issue on the fact that the project belonged to the 
community rather than the university.  But instead, the court took on the 
tougher question of what constitutes a “religious” university. 
To answer this question, the court focused almost exclusively on the 
university’s mission and religious control of university governance—two of 
the same factors considered by the court in Horace Mann League.134  The 
Missouri Supreme Court ultimately found that evidence of academic freedom 
in research and the independence of the governing board provided sufficient 
separation from the Church.135  Such findings are also in line with the Supreme 
Court’s findings in Tilton and Roemer, where academic freedom and 
independence from the Church weighed heavily in the decisions that funding 
RACs was constitutional.136 
Interestingly, another Horace Mann League factor—image—was 
addressed by the ACLU in their amicus brief, where they claimed SLU’s 
website promoted a Catholic school,137 but was not discussed by the Missouri 
Supreme Court.138  The power of a website in modern society to promote an 
organization’s image and influence public opinion is undeniable, as many 
people today turn to the Internet first when looking for information on a 
business or organization.  However, the ACLU’s argument seems to fall short 
after looking at the current university website.  Visitors are greeted by a banner 
of pictures featuring a variety of current events and by important information 
pertaining to the university and the community.139  Items appearing on the 
banner in the past have included choosing a major, new programs available at 
SLU, Billiken (SLU’s mascot) sports, study abroad opportunities, best places 
to hang out in St. Louis, and spiritual growth.140  Information on “spirituality,” 
 
 133. Johnson, supra note 132. 
 134. In fact, these were the first two factors named by the court in Horace Mann League.  See 
supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 42, 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 726–28 
(Mo. 2007) (analyzing any potential violation of the Missouri Establishment Clause by looking 
only at the Mason’s arguments of control by religious creed through SLU’s Jesuit affiliation and 
governance structure.). 
 139. SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/index.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 140. Id.  The website is updated periodically to reflect the news, events, and information most 
current or pertinent for the time of year or what is happening in current events, so not all items 
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the “Jesuit tradition,” and “campus ministry” is displayed no more prominently 
than any other information to be conveyed to prospective students or 
parents.141  Arguably, the appearance of such information is irrelevant to the 
question of religious control, since the website of nearly every university in 
America, including public universities, contains information on different 
religious organizations and opportunities to attend religious services.142 
Taking into account all the factors—the mission of the university, the 
practice of academic freedom in all scholastic fields, the independence of the 
governing board, and the religious diversity among students and faculty—the 
court reached the proper decision in this case.  But even more importantly, 
looking at the larger picture, the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on 
much the same factual analysis found in other similar state and federal funding 
cases.  The establishment of this precedent helps alleviate concerns of 
inequality when adjudicating RAC funding challenges under Missouri 
constitutional law.143 
B. Case Study: University of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker 
1. Facts, Arguments, and Court Findings 
In 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of 
using public funding to construct a new pharmacy school at University of the 
Cumberlands (UC).144  UC, formerly called Cumberland College, is a small 
private school that was founded by Baptists in 1887.145  The college is located 
in Williamsburg, Kentucky, the heart of Appalachia, and has historically 
served students from this rural mountain region.146  The university specializes 
 
appear in the banner at all times.  For instance, during the World Cup, the banner included a 
feature on SLU soccer with a Q&A with SLU’s soccer coach.  Those items not featured in the 
banner are generally still available via other links on the website.  Id. 
 141. A link to information on the Jesuit tradition is found under the section for prospective 
students under “About SLU.” About SLU, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x5029.xml 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010).  The information on spiritual opportunities appears under “Campus 
Life.” Campus Life, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x24194.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010).  There is a section on faith, but the page also contains links for Greek life, the recreation 
center, residential life, clubs, and Busch Student Center, among others.  Id. 
 142. For example, University of Missouri-Columbia, the leading state university in Missouri, 
also includes information regarding religious opportunities and activities for students on its 
website.  Chancelor’s Diversity Initiative, UNIV. OF MO., http://diversity.missouri.edu/resources/ 
religious.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 143. Saint Louis Univ., 220 S.W.3d at 726–29. 
 144. Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 679 (Ky. 2010), aff’g 
Pennybacker v. Beshear, No. 06-CI-00554, 2008 WL 644848 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 145. Id. at 671. 
 146. Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *3. 
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in a broad-based “liberal arts education enriched with Christian values.”147  UC 
is also associated with the Kentucky Baptist Convention (KBC) and the 
Southern Baptist Convention.148  In 2006, the Kentucky General Assembly 
granted $10 million dollars for use in construction of a new pharmacy school 
on the campus.149  The grant did not include a restriction on the use of the 
building, but the university submitted a memorandum guaranteeing it would 
use the building for secular education only or transfer possession to the county 
if it could not meet this promise.150 
Like Saint Louis University, this case was also decided under state 
constitutional law.151  The Kentucky’s Right of Religious Freedom states “[n]o 
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society, or 
denomination . . . nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of 
worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such 
place . . . .”152  And like Missouri, the Kentucky Constitution also includes a 
similar specific provision with regard to government funding of education.153  
Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution creates a further restriction against 
government involvement with religion, providing that “[n]o portion of any 
fund or tax . . . levied for educational purposes, shall be appropriated to, or 
used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational school.”154  
Despite this similarity to the Missouri provision, here the Franklin Circuit 
Court ruled against the university, finding that the appropriation violated both 
Sections 5 and 189 of the Kentucky Constitution.155  UC appealed the 
 
 147. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  The grant was apparently meant to help address the statewide shortage of licensed 
pharmacists.  It was part of a larger three-part funding plan which included 80 million dollars to 
the University of Kentucky for construction of a Biological/Pharmaceutical complex and the 
formation of a Pharmacy Scholarship Program, and the 10 million dollars to UC for construction 
of a pharmacy school.  See Brief for Appellant at 3, Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d 668 
(No. 2008-SC-00253-TG).  The appropriation made to UC was in the form of bond financing, 
where the Kentucky Infrastructure Authority sold bonds to private investors.  Univ. of the 
Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671.  Pursuant to state law, principal was paid using taxes on coal 
severance, and interest payments came from the General Fund.  Id. 
 150. Id. at 672.  The agreement was between the Commonwealth itself and the university, and 
could be cancelled by either party at any time for “cause.”  Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *2.  
For a look at how little information the legislative grant included, see 2006 Ky. Acts 201. 
 151. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671. 
 152. KY. CONST. § 5. 
 153. Compare KY. CONST. § 189, with MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8. 
 154. KY. CONST. § 189. 
 155. Pennybacker, 2008 WL 644848, at *2.   The circuit court based this decision on Fiscal 
Court of Jefferson County v. Brady, a 1994 Kentucky Supreme Court decision, which used the 
entanglement prong of the Lemon test as guidance in determining that direct funding of non-
public schools was a violation of the Kentucky constitution.  Id. at *4–*5.  The circuit court 
believed the funding allocated to UC was exactly the kind of direct funding the Kentucky 
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judgment to the court of appeals but then successfully moved to transfer the 
case to the Kentucky Supreme Court.156 
Unlike in Saint Louis University, the issue in this case focused not on 
whether UC was a “religious” university, but whether the funds were raised for 
educational purposes.157  To this end, UC argued the appropriation was 
constitutional because it fulfilled a public need.158  Indeed, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court has previously held “a private agency may be utilized as the 
pipe-line through which a public expenditure is made, the test being not who 
receives the money, but the character of the use for which it is expended.”159  
UC argued that these permitted “private” institutions must necessarily also 
include RACs.160  They argued that the circuit court’s interpretation of Section 
189 was overbroad and would exclude religious institutions like UC from all 
funding, not just from restricted educational funding.161  The university further 
argued that the funds in question were not raised for “educational purposes,” 
which would be restricted under Section 189, but rather that they were raised 
for “health and welfare purpose[s],” to address the healthcare problem of a 
statewide pharmacist shortage.162 
In attacking UC’s argument on the use of the funds, Rev. Albert M. 
Pennybacker and those who joined him in opposing the grant argued there was 
no evidence of any shortage of pharmacists.163  They further stated that the 
memorandum, meant to act as a safeguard against any secular use of the funds, 
was worthless, stating that it “might as well have been written with 
 
Supreme Court had overruled in Brady.  Id. at *3–*4 (citing Fiscal Court of Jefferson Cnty. v. 
Brady, 885 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Ky. 1994)). 
 156. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 671.  Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide that within ten days of filing an appeal with the court of appeals, a party may file a 
motion for transfer to the supreme court.  The supreme court retains discretion to grant or deny 
the motion for transfer but will take into consideration whether the case is one of public 
importance.  KY. R. CIV. P. 74.02. 
 157. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673–74. 
 158. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 16–17. 
 159. Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. 1949). 
 160. Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 18. 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Id.  The funding was appropriated from the Infrastructure for Economic Development 
Bond Pool, a pool that was frequently used to fund projects to serve the medical and healthcare 
needs of Kentucky residents.  Id. at 8.  Indeed, additional “pharmacy” and health related projects 
were part of the same legislative grant giving UC the money for construction.  See generally 2006 
Ky. Acts 252. 
 163. Brief of Appellees at 15, Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 
(Ky. 2010) (No. 2008-SC-00253-TG).  Appellees argued that the only piece of evidence was 
prepared two months after the appropriation and thus could not have been considered by the 
legislature when making its decision.  Id. at 5. 
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disappearing ink.”164  Interestingly, in addition to the main argument focusing 
on the purpose of the funds, Pennybacker also outlined that the intent of the 
KBC in supporting UC was to “advance the Kingdom of God in the area of 
Christian higher education.”165  As evidence of these deeply entrenched values, 
Pennybacker highlighted a recent incident where the university expelled a 
student purportedly for his sexual orientation.166 
Though UC made a valiant technical argument for the constitutionality of 
the funding, things did not look promising for the university even before an 
official ruling was made.  Following oral arguments before the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, The Courier-Journal out of Louisville reported that several 
justices were skeptical of how such funding could be allowed under the clear 
language of Section 189.167  Chief Justice John Minton reportedly seemed 
especially unwilling to accept the argument that “pharmacy education is not 
education,” a necessary prerequisite to finding the funding constitutional.168 
The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the university, 
finding the appropriation unconstitutional.169  In reaching this decision, the 
court briefly discussed the apparent religious nature of UC, finding it was 
clearly a “church, sectarian, or denominational school” covered by Section 
189.170  The court further stated that the memorandum UC had signed, 
guaranteeing the secular use of the funds, could not change the nature of the 
institution itself.171  Determining UC fell under the restriction of Section 189, 
the court turned its attention to whether the funds were for the prohibited 
educational purpose.172  Responding to UC’s health and welfare argument, the 
court asked: How does construction of a building on campus address the 
pharmacist shortage unless students are educated so they can pass the state 
exam?173  The court found this case distinguishable from Kentucky Building 
Commission v. Effron174 because there the funds were appropriated to a 
religiously-affiliated hospital; thus the issue of whether the funds were for 
 
 164. Id. at 15.  Recall that either party could cancel the agreement for cause.  See supra note 
150 and accompanying text. 
 165. Brief of Appellees, supra note 163, at 2. 
 166. Id. at 10. 
 167. Deborah Yetter, Court Hears Case of Funding for Cumberlands Pharmacy School, 
COURIER-J., Sept. 25, 2009, at B5. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 679. 
 170. Id. at 673.  The court used much of the same language concerning the KBC’s purpose in 
supporting UC that Pennybacker and the other appellees had included in their brief.  Compare id., 
with source cited supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 171. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673. 
 172. Id. at 673–74. 
 173. Id. at 674 (emphasis added). 
 174. Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] SCALING THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 417 
educational purposes was not raised.175  Rather, the court equated the proposed 
facility to a textbook, finding they were equally for educational purposes,176 
and relied on Fannin v. Williams, where the court banned the supply of 
textbooks to non-public schools,177 to find the UC funding unconstitutional 
under Section 189.178 
2. Analysis of the Court’s Decision 
Supporters of UC argued that Section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution 
was one of the discriminatory nineteenth century Blaine Amendments which, 
given the nature and history of these amendments, raised Equal Protection 
concerns.179  But as evidenced by Saint Louis University, some states with 
these more restrictive provisions are adjudicating constitutional challenges in a 
manner that is consistent with other federal and state case law that is 
permissive toward RAC funding.180  Unfortunately, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court largely glossed over the issue of whether UC was a “religious” 
university, taking its affiliation with the KBC as undeniable proof that it was, 
forcing the outcome of this case, like so many before, to turn on the use of the 
funds themselves.181  Thus, we have not been able to see where Kentucky 
would stand in an examination of factors similar to those used by courts in 
cases such as Saint Louis University and Horace Mann League. 
Because the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to address the issue, it is 
useful to independently analyze how this case may have been decided had the 
doctrines of cases like Tilton, Roemer, and Saint Louis University been 
applied.  First, one must look at the mission statement and purpose of the 
university itself.  Here, UC openly promotes that it strives “to graduate men 
and women with Christian values derived from spiritual and intellectual 
experience within the university community as well as from the traditional 
academic disciplines.”182  This commitment to Christian values attracted some 
 
 175. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 674 (discussing Ky. Bldg. Comm’n, 220 
S.W.2d at 838). 
 176. Id. at 675. 
 177. Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1983). 
 178. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 675, 679. 
 179. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at 5, 12, Univ. of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (No. 2008-SC-000253-TG). 
 180. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 181. Univ. of the Cumberlands, 308 S.W.3d at 673. 
 182. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, 2010–2011 UNDERGRADUATE CATALOG 1, available at 
http://www.ucumberlands.edu/academics/catalog/2010_UG.pdf.  As part of its General Education 
Curriculum, all students are required to take six credit hours in Christian Faith.  Id. at 30.  One of 
the classes toward this requirement must be either Old Testament Survey or New Testament 
Survey.  Id.  SLU also requires nine credit hours in Theology as part of its Bachelor of Arts core 
curriculum.  College of Arts and Sciences Bachelor of Arts Core Curriculum Requirement, SAINT 
LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x12584.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).  SLU students must 
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unwanted press in 2006, after a student was reportedly expelled for violating a 
university policy forbidding promotion of homosexuality after he openly 
discussed his sexual orientation on a MySpace page.183  The issue hit the 
papers again in 2009 when the university rescinded its offer to a Texas youth 
group to come help build homes for the poor, after the group openly endorsed 
homosexual behavior.184  Interestingly, UC also stated that it “encourage[d] 
students to think critically and creatively . . . [to] prepare themselves for lives 
of responsible service and leadership.”185  This is similar to one of the goals 
stressed by SLU that helped show the court that the university was committed 
to academic freedom.186  Academic freedom in areas inconsistent with core 
religious values can go a long way in determining a school is not pervasively 
sectarian.187  Unfortunately, the recurring intolerances at UC seem to indicate 
there is not a high degree of freedom and that, perhaps, UC is incapable of 
separating itself from its religious affiliation. 
Next, it is helpful to look at the governing structure of the university.  
Unfortunately, as this topic was not going to be addressed by the court, it was 
not briefed by the parties, and therefore, there is less information available here 
than in Saint Louis University.  It is clear, however, that the university utilizes 
several committees, the first and foremost being the President’s Cabinet.188  
 
take THEO 100, a foundational course, followed by a 200 and 300 level course of their choice.  
Id.  For a Bachelor of Science at SLU, the requirement is only six hours, dropping the 300 level 
course requirement. College of Arts and Sciences Bachelor of Science Core Curriculum 
Requirement, SAINT LOUIS UNIV., http://www.slu.edu/x12585.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).  
This course requirement was not addressed by the court in Saint Louis University, but was one of 
the factors listed by the court in Horace Mann League.  See supra note 93 and accompanying 
text.  Given the large number and variety of courses offered at SLU that fulfill this requirement, 
perhaps the Missouri Supreme Court did not find it problematic.  Indeed, a look at the SLU 
course catalog shows that students can choose from classes like American Christianity, 
Jerusalem: City of Three Faiths, African American Christian Traditions, and Religion and 
Science.  SAINT LOUIS UNIV., COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES UNDERGRADUATE 
CATALOGUE: THEOLOGY 1, 3, available at http://www.slu.edu/x30851.xml.  The relatively small 
number of courses available to UC students to fulfill the requirement could have weighed 
negatively against the university.  See UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, supra, at 30. 
 183. Mark Pitsch, Student Expelled from University of Cumberlands for Being Gay, 
COURIER-J., Apr. 11, 2006, at B1. 
 184. David Hawpe, A Lesson in Love at University of the Cumberlands, COURIER-J., July 8, 
2009, at A6. 
 185. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, supra note 182, at 3. 
 186. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 188. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE 
CUMBERLANDS, 2009–2010, available at http://www.ucumberlands.edu/faculty/downloads/ 
committeelist.pdf (listing the positions and responsibilities of each committee and the names of 
its members for the current academic year).  In addition to the President’s Cabinet, other 
committees include Academic Appeals, Athletic, Catalog and Curriculum, Cultural Arts, and 
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The President’s Cabinet is responsible for overseeing day-to-day activities and 
creating a strategic plan for the future.189  It is made up of nine officers of the 
university, including the university president.190  Sadly, there is no readily-
available information on the religious affiliation of the members of the 
President’s Cabinet, nor on whether the Cabinet must report to the KBC.  It is 
hard to determine, therefore, if UC has the kind of independent governance 
necessary to show it is not religiously controlled. 
Finally, it is useful to evaluate the image promoted by the school on its 
website and how that compares with SLU.  Like SLU, visitors to the UC 
website are greeted by a banner of pictures and information.191  Highlighted 
information includes university news, an emergency notification system, and a 
calendar of upcoming events.192  Also like SLU and other universities, campus 
ministry is listed under the student life page alongside other secular campus 
activities and organizations, without overpowering them.193  Overall, UC’s 
website is quite similar to SLU’s and promotes an image of a well-rounded 
university rather than a “religious” university.194 
Despite the promising evaluation of the image of the university, there are 
several factors that weigh negatively on UC.  The pattern of intolerance for 
views and lifestyles contrary to Christian teachings, the clear support of the 
KBC, and the undetermined level of independence of the President’s Cabinet 
seem to indicate that UC may be inseparably entwined with its religious 
affiliation.  With such apparent intertwining and a lack of clear message from 
the university on academic freedom, it is likely that even a jurisdiction such as 
Missouri or Maryland would find UC pervasively religious and the funding 
unconstitutional.  But what if the facts had been slightly different?  What if 
those reports of intolerance had been instances of acceptance?  What if there 
was extensive evidence of academic freedom and governing independence?  
Under these circumstances, a court like Missouri may have found the funding 
constitutional.  But unfortunately, it is unclear when, if ever, we will get 
Kentucky’s view on the issue. 
 
Faculty Development.  Id.  Faculty members may serve on many of the sub-committees, but only 
the university officers serve on the President’s Cabinet.  Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  The cabinet is composed of the President, Vice President (VP) for Academic Affairs, 
VP for Student Services, VP for Institutional Advancement, VP for Finance, VP for Operations, 
VP for Business Services, VP for Financial Planning, and the Athletic Director.  Id. 
 191. UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, http://www.ucumberlands.edu (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Student Life, UNIV. OF THE CUMBERLANDS, http://www.ucumberlands.edu/students (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 194. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
420 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:395 
IV.  LOOKING FORWARD: HOW TO EQUALIZE THE OUTCOMES OF RAC 
FUNDING DISPUTES 
The above case studies highlight the disparity in state adjudication of 
challenges to government funding of RACs.  The question now becomes, is 
there a way to ensure Equal Protection when plaintiffs challenge RAC funding 
under state constitutional rights?  As discussed in Part II.A, a state court 
decision based on complementary state law is considered “adequate and 
independent grounds” and, thus, is unreviewable by the Supreme Court.195  
Does this mean there is nothing that can be done to alleviate the inequality 
currently seen among the states? 
The United States Constitution by no means requires states to provide 
financial assistance to private schools—regardless of whether the school is 
religiously affiliated or secular in nature.196  But, it does demand neutrality.  
According to Professor Stephen Carter, this means “government cannot take 
steps to treat religious schools better than other schools, . . . [nor] take steps to 
treat religious schools worse.”197  Thus, Carter argues, if the state chooses to 
make public aid available to secular private schools, it would be discriminatory 
not to offer the same aid to religious schools.198  This is the general argument 
against the Blaine Amendments, since such amendments tend to single out 
religious or denominational institutions for the prohibition of state or public 
aid.199  Because of this discriminatory nature, there have been numerous 
challenges to these amendments. 
Opponents have tried challenging the constitutionality of these state 
provisions under both the Free Exercise200 and Equal Protection201 clauses.  
The court recently rejected a Free Exercise challenge in Locke v. Davey202 and 
instead seemed to show support for state covenants prohibiting funding 
religious schools and programs, stating, “we can think of few areas in which a 
State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.”203  Others have 
 
 195. See text accompanying note 89. 
 196. DeForrest, supra note 77, at 608. 
 197. Id. (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993)). 
 198. Id. at 608–09. 
 199. Id. at 607–08. 
 200. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This provision is the second religion clause in the First 
Amendment immediately following the Establishment Clause.  The provision reads, “Congress 
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”  Id. 
 201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 202. See generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (finding that a Washington 
scholarship program that prohibited giving funds to students pursuing a devotional or theological 
degree did not violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
 203. Id. at 722.  The court, thus, found that the state had a substantial interest in imposing the 
restriction while the statute placed only a minor burden upon recipients.  Id. at 725.  Indeed, 
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argued the state provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause.  For example, 
in University of the Cumberlands, The Becket Fund, as amicus curie, argued 
that Section 189 raised serious Equal Protection concerns and urged the 
Kentucky Supreme Court to interpret the provision narrowly to avoid 
conflicting with the federal constitution.204  But even if the Supreme Court 
were to find a violation of the Equal Protection clause, that may not alleviate 
the problem.  The Becket Fund noted that approximately 99% of Kentucky K-
12 students attending private school were attending a non-secular school.205  In 
addition, Kentucky has over thirty private colleges and universities, several of 
which are religiously-affiliated, even if only maintaining historic ties and no 
longer adhering to a religious creed.206  By simply denying funding to all 
private schools, a state like Kentucky can maintain its disproportionate 
discriminatory ban on funding religious schools and circumvent Equal 
Protection, as it is not required to fund private schools at all.207 
Perhaps fighting to extinguish these state provisions through federal action 
is not the answer.  Cases like Maryland’s Horace Mann League and Missouri’s 
Saint Louis University show that a restrictive state provision on funding 
“religion” does not necessarily bar finding in favor of the RAC under proper 
circumstances.208  The key is how the court addresses the question.  Where the 
court analyzes the underlying nature of the recipient of the funding, such as in 
Saint Louis University, the results among states are more equal.  But where the 
focus is on the use of funds—the type and location of a proposed building 
project, the purchase of textbooks, or the provision of transportation for school 
children—the results can vary widely.  Thus, courts should focus on 
harmonizing the adjudication of claims, making sure that courts examine the 
true nature of an institution, so that similar universities receive equal treatment 
across the country. 
 
recipients were not barred from attending pervasively religious schools, from practicing any given 
religion, or from taking theological courses.  Id. at 724–25.  The only restriction was they could 
not use the funds to pursue a theological major or degree.  Id. at 725 n.9. 
 204. Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 179, at 12, 15. 
 205. Id. at 12. 
 206. See Paolo Turchioe, The Best Religiously Affiliated Colleges, FORBES.COM (May 21, 
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/religiously-affiliated-colleges-leadership-
education-best.html.  Some of the oldest universities in America were founded by religious 
orders.  Id.  Many have severed formal ties, maintaining only loose historic ties, and like SLU, no 
longer govern subject to a religious creed.  Id.  Indeed several RACs have esteemed reputations 
for strong academics.  Id.  But the highest ranked RAC in the country is Centre College located in 
Danville, Kentucky.  Id.  Centre College, which maintains only historic ties to its Presbyterian 
founding, ranked ahead of even big name RACs, like Boston College and Notre Dame.  Id. 
 207. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
 208. Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 729 (Mo. 
2007); Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 76 (Md. 1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
The fight over separation of church and state is one of the oldest in 
America.  It is a fight that stems back to the debate between the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists on whether to even include a provision on religious freedom 
in the Constitution.209  It is a question that has plagued the Court equally as 
long, requiring it to determine what constitutes “establishment” of religion or 
what action presents undue government “entanglement” in religion.  With the 
passage of the Higher Education Acts in the 1960s, government funding of 
religious schools—and more specifically RACs—became a hot button issue in 
the courts.210  The Supreme Court has chosen a path of neutrality on the issue, 
holding that so long as the institution is not “pervasively sectarian” and can 
show an independent, dominant academic purpose, the funding is 
constitutional. 
But the dual system of government creates new challenges for RACs 
hoping to receive public funding.  In the 1800s, several states amended their 
constitutions to include more restrictive provisions on government action and 
aid with respect to religion and religiously affiliated organizations, like 
universities.211  Since this time, the ability of a RAC to overcome a state 
constitutional challenge to public funding has been severely curtailed.  In the 
last fifty years, state courts have made great strides in the way they adjudicate 
these claims, some even using guidelines similar to the federal courts.  But 
even today, RACs facing a challenge to proposed funding in different states 
that have similar constitutional provisions may receive unequal treatment.  The 
key to resolving this issue is to standardize the way in which courts approach 
the issue—to look at the true nature of the recipient rather than accepting a 
religious affiliation at face value. 
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